MindTraceA Memory–Action Architecture for Long-Horizon Social Simulation
Technical Report · August 2026
Ao Tang, Yong Qiao
Abstract
Long-running social simulations need agents to remember the same world differently. Yet as shared context grows, agents that began with distinct personas can drift toward similar behavior. MindTrace addresses this problem by storing world events separately from each agent's memory of them. A personal memory retains how the agent learned an event, whether the information still holds, and how readily it can be recalled.
The architecture forms a causal loop: events create personal memories, recalled memories guide decisions, decisions create new events, and memories that actually influenced an action become easier to recall again. Recall combines relevance with current memory accessibility, while evidence strength determines whether an agent can take a high-consequence action or should verify first. An attention scheduler changes processing depth without changing the order of the loop. Mechanism-validation runs with 9 agents over 30, 120, and 240 simulation steps exhibit the complete loop, importance review, memory dormancy and return, context-triggered reactivation, and explicit judgments about memory state.
Keywords long-term memory · social simulation · source-aware memory · retrieval · evidence-gated action · attention scheduling
Introduction
Why long-running agents converge
A long-horizon simulation is useful only if its agents develop distinct histories inside the same world. Personality descriptions and action templates are not enough: as shared context accumulates, behavior tends to repeat and agents begin to converge. A study spanning several models and forty simulated social days reports high rolling action repetition [1]. What keeps two agents different is not just what happened, but who learned it first, who reported it, whether it was verified, whether it later shaped a decision, and how long it has gone unused.
Consider a resident who hears from a neighbor that tomorrow's community meeting has been canceled. Another resident reads the official notice, while a third still remembers the original schedule. All three refer to the same meeting, but they do not hold the same evidence and should not make the same decision. A memory system that stores only the sentence “the meeting is canceled” erases those differences.
MindTrace treats memory as evolving internal state rather than accumulated text. Perception, recall, decision, action, and reuse form one loop, so an agent's history grows from what it experienced and what it did with that experience. The architecture asks three questions: how does an event become a source-aware personal memory, how much action can the available evidence support, and how does using a memory change future recall?
Contributions
- Shared events, personal memories. The world keeps one record of what happened, while each agent retains its own account with source, time, and validity. Misunderstanding, hearsay, and correction remain visible instead of collapsing into one text.
- Memory shaped by time and use. A memory becomes harder to recall when it is left unused and easier to recall when it guides a decision, is repeated, or returns through a related context.
- Evidence-gated action. The evidence behind a memory is matched to the consequence of an action. When support is too weak, the next step is verification rather than an unsupported high-consequence action.
- Attention-constrained processing. Activity, sleep, and the salience of new information determine whether a cognitive step runs in full, runs in reduced form, or is skipped.
Architecture Overview
MindTrace has three state domains: world, memory, and decision. Four transitions connect them into a loop. The world records what happened; each agent forms a personal memory of the event; retrieved memories support a decision; and the completed action returns to the world as a new event. A fourth transition updates only the memories that actually supported the action. The attention scheduler decides how deeply each step can run. Figure 1 shows the complete loop, and Table 1 states the responsibility of each transition.
In the meeting example, the cancellation notice is a world event. One resident sees it directly and another hears it through a neighbor, producing two memories with different source paths. If either resident changes a plan, that decision creates a new event. The memory used to justify the change is then reinforced, while merely retrieved alternatives are not.
| Transition | Core question | Main product |
|---|---|---|
| World → Memory | How did this agent learn about the event? | A personal memory with source and time |
| Memory → Decision | What comes to mind, and is the evidence strong enough to act? | Retrieved memories and an action decision |
| Decision → World | How does a decision become a new fact observable by others? | A time-ordered world event |
| Decision → Memory | Which memories actually supported the action? | Updated accessibility and use history |
| Attention scheduling | How deeply should this moment be processed? | Full, reduced, or skipped processing |
From Shared Events to Personal Memory
One event, different accounts
The world keeps events in the order in which they occurred, giving every agent the same temporal reference. Personal memory does not copy that event log. It records how the agent encountered an event: performing an action creates first-hand memory, seeing it happen creates witnessed memory, and hearing about it preserves the path from the speaker back to the originating event. Different accounts can therefore refer to the same underlying event without becoming identical (Figure 2).
Two identifiers keep this distinction intact. Event identity answers “is this still the same meeting?” and merges repeated exposure to the same event. Source identity answers “how do I know?” and separates direct experience, one person's report, and confirmation from an independent source. In memory research, this ability to remember where information came from is called source monitoring; in MindTrace, it determines whether information is treated as experience, report, or inference.
What was true may no longer be true
An agent may still remember that the meeting was canceled after it has been rescheduled. The memory remains part of the agent's history, but it should no longer justify a current action. MindTrace therefore stores historical content separately from current validity. Conclusions derived from several memories also retain links to their supporting evidence. When one supporting memory becomes invalid, the conclusion returns for review. This follows the persistent-node and dependency-propagation ideas used in truth-maintenance systems [2], [3].
How Memories Fade and Return
Accessibility as ease of recall
A memory should not remain equally available forever. MindTrace represents its current ease of recall as accessibility a. An active memory can appear through ordinary recall. A dormant memory needs a direct cue to return. An inaccessible memory has passed beyond retrieval in the current lifecycle. These states describe availability, not truth: an active memory can be wrong, and a dormant memory can still be historically accurate.
Accessibility decays exponentially. Each effective half-life H(m) cuts the current value in half.
- a(m)
- Current accessibility of memory m, ranging from 0 to 1.
- m
- A specific memory.
- Δt
- Simulated time since the memory was last used or reactivated.
- H(m)
- Effective half-life of memory m, measured in the same unit as Δt.
A fixed half-life would make every memory fade at the same rate. MindTrace instead lengthens the effective half-life of memories that matter or have been reinforced:
Important and repeatedly reinforced memories remain accessible for longer.
- H0
- Base half-life; the experiments use 72 simulated hours.
- imp(m)
- Importance assigned to memory m.
- imp0
- Reference point of the importance scale; the ratio is 1 when importance is unavailable.
- R(m)
- Combined reinforcement from repeated exposure, actual use, and independent sources.
Each additional reinforcement helps, but its marginal effect becomes smaller.
- d
- Number of repeated exposures to the same event.
- u
- Number of decisions that actually used the memory.
- s
- Number of independent sources that mentioned the event.
- σ(n)
- A saturating map from a non-negative count into the interval from 0 to 1.
A memory is active when a ≥ 2−3, dormant when 2−5 ≤ a < 2−3, and inaccessible when a < 2−5. Because the decay function uses base two, those boundaries occur after three and five effective half-lives (Figure 3).
From Recall to Action
Two paths back to memory
Ordinary recall asks two questions: how relevant is this memory to the current situation, and how readily can the agent recall it now? MindTrace multiplies those two values:
A memory ranks highly only when it is both relevant to the present and currently easy to recall.
- score(m, q)
- Recall score of memory m for the current query q.
- rel(m, q)
- Semantic relevance between the memory and current query.
- a(m)
- Current accessibility defined by Equation (1).
- q
- A query formed from current perception, goals, and action context.
A direct cue follows a second path. If the current situation identifies a specific event, MindTrace can return the older memory without placing it in the ordinary ranking. Memory research describes this as cue-triggered recollection [4]. The first path covers what comes to mind on its own; the second covers what returns when prompted. Once a memory has returned, related material can continue to activate through learned associations [5].
Evidence should match consequence
Recall decides what comes to mind; evidence strength decides what the agent may safely do with it. MindTrace evaluates four properties of the available material (Table 2) and places actions into three classes: reversible, verifiable, and difficult to reverse. The harder an action is to undo or check, the stronger its supporting evidence must be (Figure 4).
| Component | Question answered | Effect on the action threshold |
|---|---|---|
| Source | Is this first-hand experience, direct observation, or a report? | First-hand material carries greater evidential weight |
| Independent sources | How many mutually independent sources raised the same event? | Separates social corroboration from repeated transmission |
| Current validity | Does the content still hold? | Outdated content remains in history but cannot support a high-consequence action |
| Source reliability | How has information from this source evolved in the past? | Adjusts the evidence class of reported material |
When the evidence is too weak for a high-consequence action, MindTrace chooses a step that can reduce uncertainty: inspect the original notice, ask a participant, or wait for an independent source. In the meeting example, a resident who heard the news second-hand checks the official notice before canceling an important plan. That verification creates a new first-hand event, becomes a new memory, and may support the later action.
How Actions Change Memory
Every action returns to the world
Every completed action becomes a new world event and may enter another agent's next perception. MindTrace derives consequence from the structure of the action itself. An action with an explicit inverse is reversible. An action whose result can be checked through a new observation is verifiable. An action that changes another person's state and has no direct inverse is difficult to reverse. The evidence threshold therefore reflects what the action can do in the simulated world.
Only used memories are reinforced
Each decision records which memories actually supported it. Only those memories receive an update; appearing in a candidate list is not enough. The update increments u in Equation (3), recalculates the effective half-life, and restarts decay from the memory's current accessibility. In this way, use has a lasting effect on what the agent is likely to remember next.
Memory can also recover without directly supporting an action. Hearing the same event again increments repeated exposure d; hearing it from a genuinely independent source increments s; and a related context can reactivate it indirectly. Together, these paths let memories strengthen through use, return through new information, and still fade when nothing brings them back.
When supporting evidence changes
A conclusion can depend on several memories. MindTrace keeps those links, so a conclusion returns for review when one of its supporting memories becomes outdated or dormant. If current support is restored, the conclusion can become usable again. If a critical piece is missing, the conclusion remains part of the agent's history but cannot support a high-consequence action.
Attention as a Processing Budget
Attention budget
An agent should not process every moment at full depth. MindTrace treats attention as a limited daily budget. Waking time sets the available capacity, actions and incoming information consume it, and sleep restores it according to the agent's schedule.
The time grid sets hourly capacity. Waking hours determine the full daily budget, and sleep duration determines how quickly it recovers.
- Δslot
- Minutes per time slot; the experiments use 10 minutes.
- C
- Number of slots in one simulated hour; here, 6.
- Afull
- Full daily attention budget.
- hwake
- Habitual waking duration.
- hsleep
- Habitual sleep duration.
- rrecover
- Attention restored per hour of sleep.
Time spent acting is the main cost. New information adds a smaller cost for processing what arrived.
- costhour
- Attention consumed during the current simulated hour.
- activity
- Activity formed by actions and incoming information.
- durationmin
- Duration in minutes of each completed action.
- arrivals
- Number of new items to process during the current hour.
- clamp(x, 1, C)
- Bounds activity between a base cost and hourly capacity.
Full, reduced, or skipped
reduced, ⅓ ≤ α < ⅔
skip, α < ⅓
The remaining budget selects full, reduced, or skipped processing. Highly salient information may raise the result by one level.
- α
- Current attention as a fraction of the full budget, ranging from 0 to 1.
- mode(α)
- Processing level assigned to the current cognitive segment.
- ⅔ and ⅓
- Boundaries that divide a full daily attention budget into three equal regions.
Reduced processing preserves the minimum useful result: an agent may recall fewer memories or continue an existing plan instead of reconsidering everything. A skipped step records whether sleep, an ongoing action, or low attention caused the omission. Salience combines novelty, direct personal relevance, and conflict with what the agent already believes. The scheduler chooses only the level; each cognitive module decides what “reduced” means for its own work. This separation follows the module autonomy of blackboard scheduling systems [9]. Figure 5 shows one agent's attention over a simulated day — consumption, recovery, and the switching of processing levels.
Mechanism Validation
Experimental setup
We run continuous simulations with 9 agents, one simulated hour per step, at horizons of 30, 120, and 240 steps. These runs cover approximately 1.25, 5, and 10 simulated days. As the horizon grows, the short causal loop, importance review, and full memory-state cycle successively enter the observable range (Table 3), revealing how the mechanisms connect and operate together.
| Horizon | Individuals × steps | Main observation | Representative readings |
|---|---|---|---|
| Short | 9 × 30 | All four transitions operate; verification creates first-hand evidence | 5,288 world events; 405 use-based memory updates; 17 high-consequence evidence decisions |
| Medium | 9 × 120 | Importance review begins; attention produces mixed processing levels | 367 importance reviews; 127 reduced segments |
| Long | 9 × 240 | Active–dormant–returned cycles appear; agents express judgments about their own memory | 525 transitions to dormancy; 219 cue returns; 290 context-triggered reactivations; 116 memory-state expressions |
What appears at each horizon
The 30-step run is long enough to expose the full evidence-to-action loop. Of 17 high-consequence actions that required evidence, 9 passed the evidence threshold and 8 became verification steps. Two of the 9 allowed actions used first-hand memories created by an earlier verification, making verification a source of evidence for later decisions.
The 120-step run reaches the review window of the default half-life, so importance can begin to change how quickly a memory fades. The 240-step run crosses three effective half-lives and exposes the full state cycle: 525 memories become dormant, 219 return through direct cues, and 290 return through related context. Of 944 importance judgments, 349 extend the memory's subsequent half-life. This order matches Equations (1)–(3) (Figure 6).
Validation results
Together, the three horizons show the complete MindTrace process: events form source-aware personal memories; relevance and accessibility bring memories into recall; the evidence threshold selects action or verification; and actual use reinforces what is more likely to return. As simulated time continues, importance review, dormancy, cue return, context return, and memory-state expression emerge in the designed order.
Related Work
Most long-term agent-memory research asks how memories should be written, compressed, and retrieved. MindTrace begins with the next question: once a memory has been retrieved, is its evidence strong enough to justify an action, and does using it change what the agent will recall later? Work showing that selective memory intervention can outperform continuous injection supports the decision to expose memory state only when it matters [6]. Human-inspired memory architectures similarly treat maturation and retrieval-time reconsolidation as central mechanisms [7].
The decay of accessibility, return through a cue, and activation of associated material connect MindTrace to classical work in memory psychology and cognitive modeling [4], [5]. Rechecking a conclusion when its support changes follows truth-maintenance systems [2], [3]. The attention scheduler borrows module autonomy from blackboard systems [9], while its distinction between deliberate processing and continuing an established behavior aligns with dual-process theory and habit research [8], [10].
Conclusion
MindTrace makes memory part of the causal state of a social simulation. The world records what happened; each agent remembers that event from its own position; accessibility determines what is likely to return; evidence strength limits what the agent can safely do; and actual use changes future recall. Attention adds a cost to this process by limiting how deeply an agent can think at each simulated moment.
The validation runs show the intended loop operating across several time scales. Verification can create first-hand evidence for a later action; important or reused memories fade more slowly; dormant memories can return through a cue or related context; and agents can express uncertainty about what they remember. MindTrace thus shows how individual differences can continue to grow from experience, information source, action choice, and memory use instead of remaining fixed in an initial persona.
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